

A study into new changes and countermeasures against Tibet independence splittist activities in the post-Dalai era

Masters Thesis

Public Security University of China

Student no: 2013212036
Writer: Wang Yanmin
Specialisation: Public security studies
Research direction: Criminology

7 April 2017

People's Public Security University of China Master's Thesis

Thesis title: A study into new changes and countermeasures against Tibet independence splittist activities in the post-Dalai era

Writer: Wang Yanmin

Supervisor: Professor Dai Jicheng, People's Public Security University of China

Thesis submission date: 7 April 2017

Degree granting unit: People's Public Security University of China

A study into new changes and countermeasures against Tibet independence splittist activities in the post-Dalai era

[...]

1.3.2 The Tibetan Central Administration

In 2011, The “exiled Tibet independence clique” convened an “Additional Meeting of 14th Tibetan People’s Congress” and changed the name of the “Government in Exile” to the “Central Tibetan Administration.” It is understood that the Dalai Lama forcefully intervened in discussions about the name change, and when asking the representatives to pass the name change, an “additional congress” of the “parliament” was added at his demand. Dalai insisted on changing the names for the reason that Indian law does not permit Tibetan exiles to exist in the form of a “government” or a “state.” There are three main purposes for changing the name from “The Tibetan Government in Exile” to “The Central Tibetan Administration”: one was to remove “Tibet” for the stronger concept of a “greater Tibet”; the second was to remove “exile” for the broader “entirety of the Tibetan people”; and third was to dilute the officious tone and give more prominence to the so-called separation of powers.

1.3.3 The post-Dalai era

In 2011, the Dalai clique proceeded to hand over political power, and “the post-Dalai era” refers to the Fourteenth Dalai making arrangements in his later years for after his death in order to extend the transitional “handover” period to maintain political power within his group. There are differences between the “post-Dalai era” [Ch: *hou dalai shiqi*] and the “after-Dalai era” [Ch: *dalai shiqi hou*]: the “post-Dalai era” is the later era of the Fourteenth Dalai; and the “after-Dalai era” will be the period after the Fourteenth Dalai has passed away. The “post-Dalai era” is the period when the Fourteenth Dalai is making arrangement for the “after-Dalai era.”

[...]

2.2 A risk analysis of “Tibet independence”

In 1959, the Fourteenth Dalai and the Tibetan elite’s ruling clique opposed democratic reforms and following the failure of their armed rebellion went into foreign exile, where they established the “Tibetan Government in Exile.” With the support of hostile Western anti-China forces, they established a base camp for Tibet independence activities from where they carried out a series of activities that destroyed stability in Tibetan areas and harmed national interests.

[...]

3.2 New changes in the “post-Dalai era” pseudo regime

On 11 March 2011, the foreign-exiled Fourteenth Dalai sent a letter to the fourteenth “Tibetan People’s Congress” proposing his retirement, and on 28 May, the “congress” confirmed the Dalai’s “retirement” by means of a “constitutional amendment.” This marked the political “retirement” of the Dalai and the “elevation” of U.S.-supported Lobsang Sangay, and marked the Dalai clique entering into the “post-Dalai era.” The various institutions and systems of the “post-Dalai era” pseudo regime are constantly changing, with the Dalai wanting only support from the international community and exiled Tibetans to restart political preparations for him to “go home.”

[...]

3.2.2 Changes to the “Government in Exile” and “Kalon Tripa” appellations

“The Additional Meeting of Fourteenth Tibetan People’s Congress” was convened on 28 May 2011, and changed the name of the “Government in Exile” to the “Central Tibetan Administration.” Although the changes roused fierce opposition among Tibetan youths loyal to the Dalai, the Dalai still supported the name

change for the reason that Indian law does not permit Tibetan exiles to exist in the form of a “government” or a “state,” and if the name was not changed, the existence of Tibetan exiles in India following the Dalai’s “retirement” would become ever more difficult. On a certain level, the new appellation weakened the political tone, bringing it closer to being some kind of institution or structure, but the new appellation was still vague and unclear. In September 2012, the Dalai clique convened “The Second Tibetan People’s Special Congress,” again by means of a “constitutional amendment,” and changed the name of the “Kalon Tripa” to the “Sikyong.” In Tibetan, “*sikyong*” means “upholds government affairs,” but in practice it is “executive official,” with a political status and authority greater than “Kalon Tripa.” This was a new political title created by the “exiled Tibet independence clique” to comport with the Dalai’s “political retirement” in the post-Dalai era. There are differences between “Sikyong” and the previously-used “regent.” “Regent” was used when a former Dalai had passed away and the successor Dalai had not yet been recognized and confirmed, or had not reached his majority and could not himself rule. This was an arrangement for preventing a power vacuum from when the new reincarnation of the Dalai was recognized and when he could assume power. However, the “regent” had to be appointed by the central [i.e., Chinese] government, but the Dalai was unwilling for a regent to wholly represent his political and religious authority and therefore, a “Sikyong” was selected, which going by appearances “transferred” some political power to the “Sikyong” without the need for a “Kalon Tripa” to take direct orders and instructions from the Dalai, and instead allowed a “Sikyong” to directly exercise political power, and thus, the political status of the newly appointed “Sikyong,” Lobsang Sangay, was heightened.

[...]

3.3.3 The Dalai clique’s strategy of “advance by retreat”¹

Everyone knows that the Dalai hasn’t proposed his “retirement” just once. In 1991, there was a series of violent acts within the Dalai clique, and in order to ease the internal contradictions the Dalai announced his “semi-retirement,” and the daily affairs of the government in exile were decided by the “Kalon Tripa,” although in the wake of this the Dalai clique still gave discretion over all major issues to the “Dalai.” In 2008, after the Dalai’s planned series of violent incidents had failed and after the failure of the attempt to sabotage the Beijing Olympics, the Dalai Lama got up to his old tricks: on the spot, the Dalai announced his “semi-retirement,” which is the same as the “advance by retreat” stratagem, which in reality was preparing public opinion for a power-grab on the “government in exile.”

With regard to the Dalai’s post-Dalai era announcement of his “retirement” and transfer of political power and his donning of a “purely religious person’s” hat, in conjunction with the government in exile’s “name change,” this too is the Dalai clique’s strategy of “advance by retreat.” First, the Dalai put out the rumour he would “retire,” hoping that like before he would have the support of exiled Tibetans and avoid the Dalai clique being internationally side-lined; second, the Dalai talking again of his “retirement” and creating the “Sikyong” was in order to heighten the political status of Lobsang Sangay within the Dalai clique, supporting his “authority” and putting him forward as a representative in talks in order to ultimately realize the transfer of and the existence of the “Government in Exile’s” political power; furthermore, the Dalai apparently relinquishing political authority and the name-change of the “Government in Exile” gave the Dalai reason to say in the international arena that from then on, he himself would change into a purely religious personage, which was to be used as a way of stripping the central government of its political authority for approving the search for the Dalai’s reincarnated soul boy. Finally, sections of the masses in Tibetan areas may have a vague understanding of the political nature of the Dalai splittist elements, and “Tibet independence” forces may take these opportunities to raise their heads, which will have a certain impact on the stability of Tibetan areas.

[...]

¹ “Advance by retreat” is a strategy attributed to Yang Xiong (BCE 53 - 18), a court official during the Han Dynasty.

4.2 Ongoing struggles around the question of the Dalai's reincarnation

On 16 December 2015 during an interview with the Taiwanese media, the Dalai once again talked about the issue of terminating reincarnation. He said, it would be very good if the over-600-years old reincarnation system could continue after him, because he himself believed that he was welcomed by the people of the world, and that he was concerned a Fifteenth incarnation of the Dalai would not be as good as him, thereby affecting the reputation of the Dalais. On 14 January 2016, the ringleader of the "Tibetan Government in Exile" said to the media, "the system of the Dalai Lamas will continue," and that they would "find the Fifteenth Dalai Lama" after the fourteenth reincarnation passes away. Evidently, the ringleader of the "Tibetan Government in Exile" exposed the Dalai's true thinking. Having once had so much to say about the reincarnation of the Dalai, such as even if the fifteenth reincarnation may be a man, a woman, a westerner, a Tibetan, an animal or an alien, it will only be if they're able to lead exiled Tibetans towards achieving the "great undertaking" of "Tibetan independence" that they will become his successor. During another interview, the Dalai said that the question of authority to declare the Dalai's reincarnation could only be decided by him alone, and no one else had the right to replace him in making that choice. But according to the "Tibetan Buddhist Reincarnation Management Measures" issued by China's State Administration on Religious Affairs, the Fourteenth Dalai has no power of decision over whether or not he reincarnates, and the ringleader of the "pseudo government" is even less qualified to decide. Zhu Weiqun, Director of the Nationalities and Religion Committee of the Chinese People's Consultative Conference considers that determining the existence of the Dalai Lamas' lineage and the Dalai Lama's reincarnation has never been a purely religious matter, and even less is it a matter of the Dalai's personal rights; rather, it is first and foremost a major local issue in Tibet, and it is an important manifestation of our country's exercise of sovereignty over Tibet. We can see from history that the reincarnation of tulkus is a belief characteristic of Tibetan Buddhism and a means of inheritance. For a long period, the theocratic system was exercised in the old Tibet, where religion was conducted by politics, and politics supported the establishment of religion. Due to the fact that the two great tulkus of the Dalai and Panchen lamas were once in control of all of Tibet's politics and religion, the struggle to find and appoint their reincarnated soul boys has always been fierce. In 1713, the Qing Emperor Kangxi gave the Fifth Panchen the title of "Panchen Ge'erdeni" and bestowed upon him a golden seal. In 1792, Emperor Qilong pacified Tibet in order to rule Tibet and wiped out the abuses there, establishing the authority of the central government while respecting religious traditions, abiding by the characteristic "Golder Urn" system believed in by the masses and establishing it as an historic system. Modern imperialist forces meddled in Tibet, and following over one hundred years of struggle over the question of tulkus' reincarnations, they became a point of struggle on obeying or weakening the central government's authority, or even attempting to be rid of it.

In 1959, after the Dalai's rebellion failed and he went into foreign exile, "spiritual authority" became the main capital of hostile Western nations' anti-China forces' support for attempts at "Tibet independence." The Dalai clique persisted with the strategy of "recognize one tulku, control one monastery, affect the Chinese Communist Party's one region." Therefore, the Dalai clique has always been in a battle of wits with us over the issue of "reincarnated soul boys" with the aim of struggling against us for the hearts and minds of the people, damaging Tibet's stability and trying for "Tibet independence." When the Tenth Panchen passed away, the Dalai started struggling with us over the right to recognize the Panchen's reincarnated soul boy, conspiring with individuals in the monastery and attempting to take from us the right to recognize the Panchen's reincarnated soul boy. The Dalai's plans for a series of actions to disrupt religious ceremonies were totally illegal and ineffective and were resolutely opposed by broad Tibetan Buddhist circles and patriotic personages. In the face of the Dalai clique's damaging actions, the policy adopted by the central government was to appear as though they were hastening the search but in actual fact they were not hastening it, but instead focusing on exposing and criticising the Dalai, laying ideological and political organizational foundations and forming patriotically progressive backbone forces in religious circles. Relevant departments in the central government and the Tibet Autonomous Region Party Committee resolutely implemented the centre's policies and directives with concentrated criticism and exposure of the Dalai and by rectifying the relevant monasteries, etc., taking resolute and decisive measures to stop trouble, ultimately completing the

work of recognising the soul boy and establishing the authority of the Chinese Communist Party and the central government and weakening the Dalai clique's capital of using religion as a tool of splittism, thus creating beneficial conditions for the long-term stability of Tibet. With regard to the experience of the Panchen's reincarnation success, we could also approach the issue of the Dalai's reincarnation in accordance with the actual situation, firmly grasping the initiative over reincarnation and preventing the Dalai clique from pre-empting us with regard to the reincarnated soul boy and making a big fuss about it. Furthermore, Tibetan Buddhism is not the exclusive property of the Dalai Lamas. Tibetan Buddhism existed long before the Dalai reincarnation system, and the Dalai reincarnation system is but one of numerous traditional tulku lineages in Tibetan Buddhism. Many hundreds of years ago, Dalai reincarnation had a body of traditional measures that respected historical systems and religious traditions, but in order to cater to Western anti-China forces and uphold their own rule, the Dalai clique have attempted to damage the reincarnation system in their need to split the Motherland, and this is bound to be opposed by some [sic] Tibetans.

Furthermore, if there is to be a resolution to the issue of the Dalai's reincarnated soul boy either by a Fifteenth Dalai being produced abroad or by the termination of the reincarnated soul boy system, this would still bring turmoil to the pseudo government even though Tibetan exiles are organized and led by their entirely democratically elected government. First, because of historical factors, the Fourteenth Dalai Lama is a theocratic leader and has the highest authority in the pseudo regime. The next reincarnated Dalai will find it very difficult to match the current Dalai's status, and therefore the Fifteenth Dalai's leadership power over Tibetan exiles will be seriously weakened; second, even if the newly selected reincarnated soul boy happens to be recognized by the international community, the young boy will have to undergo a long period of training and education before he can be qualified to be a "leader," and before this can happen, there will only be an elected government; third, there are numerous factions within the Dalai clique, and without the leadership of an authoritative leader, contradictions are bound to appear which will affect the stability of the pseudo regime; in sum, if democratically elected leaders can grasp and even lead the Dalai clique, that will cancel out the possibility of the Fifteenth Dalai ever holding political power, and the importance of the reincarnated soul boy issue will diminish, which will likely reduce the Dalai clique's degree of influence.

As the Dalai clique enters the post-Dalai era, contests surrounding the "reincarnation issue" will be unavoidable, but as far as our side is concerned, this is an opportunity: we can use the recognition of the reincarnated soul boy and the new Dalai Lama to attack the pseudo government. Under the pretext of respecting historical systems and religious traditions and with a view to reincarnation situations that may arise in the future, we should have foresight and be well prepared and take different measures for different situations. If the pseudo government violates historical systems and religious ceremonies by searching for and identifying their own reincarnated soul boy, we should similarly establish our own in opposition to theirs and use it to eat away at the Dalai's foreign influence; but if the Dalai's pseudo regime decides not to recognize the next reincarnation of the Dalai, then we can still install one and use this legitimate Dalai to oppose Tibet independence forces, weakening the foundations they have; or if the pseudo regime doesn't recognize one, we can also not recognize one, and allow the venerated title of Dalai Lama to fade away and use the opportunity to raise the influence of the Panchen and gain the support of Tibetans both within and beyond the borders. In sum, we should increase our anticipation and responses to the situations described above and draw on the experience and lessons of the Eleventh Panchen's reincarnation and turn the tide of Tibet's anti-splittist struggle in a direction more beneficial to us.

4.3 "Changing heads and swapping faces," attempts to squeeze into contact talks

Upon entering the 21st century, the central government's door has always been wide open to contact talks [Ch: *jiechu shangtan*] with the Dalai. Between 2002 and 2007, the central government held six rounds of contact talks with the private representative of the Dalai Lama (see Table 6). During these contacts with the central government, the Dalai's representative put forward claims of a "greater Tibet" and "a high degree of autonomy," saying that the "Government in Exile" had abandoned "Tibet independence." On the surface, these claims were ever more puzzling, but studying their essence, they still revolved around "Tibet independence." Even though the Dalai didn't show any sincerity in his words and actions, the central

government always considered that the Dalai Lama would admit to his mistakes and would correct his mistakes, that he would beg for the understanding of the central government and the people of the entire country, and that he would abandon the claim for “Tibet independence” and return to a patriotic position. In order to prove its sincerity in its contact talks with the Dalai Lama, the central government once expressed that the time and place of talks could first be suggested by the Dalai Lama and then later jointly agreed, but the Dalai betrayed our trust by running to the media and announcing the relevant facts of the talks. Such blatant use of the talks as a “cover” abused our trust, and such actions of making propaganda and creating public opinion was not good for both sides’ contacts. During the contact talks, there were clear disagreements between the central government and the Dalai clique. As far as the central government was concerned, the status of Tibet was recognised by the international community and it was also recognised by the Chinese people, that Tibet is an inseparable part of China; as for the reasons for the Dalai Lama’s exile, these lay in his unwillingness to abandon the dream of ruling Tibet. In order to attain this aim, the Dalai kept adjusting his strategy during the course of the contact talks, and when the situation was in his favour he’d ask for talks, and when not, he would break off talks and even use consummate political means and appear in the international arena wearing the mask of a “saint” who had completely divested himself of politics.

Table 6

Talks	Date	Location
First	September 2002	Beijing, Lhasa, Nyingtri, Shigatse, Chengdu, etc.
Second	Late May–early June 2003	Suzhou, Zhejiang, Dechen TAP in Yunnan, etc.
Third	September 2004	Guangdong, Hubei, Kardze TAP in Sichuan, etc.
Fourth	30 June–1 July 2005	The Embassy of the PRC in Switzerland
Fifth	15–23 February 2006	Guilin in Guangxi, etc.
Sixth	29 June–5 July 2007	Shanghai, Nanjing

After the “3.14” incident of 2008, the Dalai’s side requested contact talks with the central government on numerous occasions, and some Western countries even tried to put pressure on our country over this, attempting to use resistance to the Olympics as a form of blackmail to force us to cede ground. In accordance with the spirit of the central government, the central United Front Work Department met on four occasions with the Dalai’s private representative to conduct contact talks. During the contact, our side’s representatives insisted on the “one China principle” being upheld, and stated once again that “greater Tibet,” “a high degree of autonomy” and the “memorandum” were all contrary to our country’s Constitution and were unworkable in China, and that the unity of the Motherland, the integrity of the realm and respect for the nationalities were the highest interests of the Chinese people, and we were unable to make any concessions on this.

In January 2010, we arranged for the tenth round of contact talks in accordance with requirements, and after the contact talks, convened a news conference for the purpose of smashing the various lies manufactured by the Dalai clique surrounding the contact talks, staunch in our resolution for the entire nation’s people – including Tibetans – to struggle to the bitter end against the Dalai clique. As of today, it has been over six years since contact talks. Zhu Weiqun, Director of the Nationalities and Religion Committee of the Chinese People’s Consultative Conference considers that our side holding contact talks with the Dalai’s private representative was, first of all, qualitatively not the central government in discussion with the so-called “Government in Exile,” neither was it so-called “Tibetan-Han discussions,” but rather in the final analysis, it was the central government dispatching personnel for talks with the private representative of the head of a splittist clique in order to carry out refutations, guidance and advice; secondly, in accordance with a 1964 State Council resolution specifying the treasonous nature of the Dalai clique, the Dalai clique has no qualifications to discuss any matters on Tibet with the central government for the reason that their existence contravenes

the Constitution. Only if the Dalai clique dissolves the pseudo government and their pseudo congress and abolishes their pseudo constitution will they then be qualified to discuss the Constitution.

On 28 May 2011 at the “Additional Meeting of Fourteenth Tibetan People’s Congress,” the “Government in Exile” changed its name by means of a “constitutional amendment” to the “Central Tibetan Administration.” Some observers considered that to a certain extent the new appellation weakened the political tone, as “Tibetan” [Ch: *Xizang*, i.e., the adjectival form of the place-name] carries implications of sovereignty and area, whereas “Tibetan” [Ch: *Zangren*, i.e., the Tibetan people] was closer to an organization or a structure. But the new appellation is still vague and unclear. As we know, the central government has always treated the Dalai and the “Tibetan Government in Exile” differently: the Dalai’s influence and his historical legitimacy is an important foundation upon which the Party has carried out contact talks with the Dalai. Because “Central Tibetan Administration” is a little confusing, the Dalai clique attempted by means of changing heads and swapping faces in the “Government in Exile” to squeeze itself into “contact discussions” with the central government. In May 2012, the Dalai clique convened a special secret conference, the so-called 24th meeting of the “Tibet-China Peace Talks Preparatory Group,” summarizing the 10 contact talks to have taken place since 2002 and planning their next steps. In June 2012, a spokesperson for the contact talks specialized small group within the “Central Tibetan Administration” said that the “Central Tibetan Administration” had already made “preparations for appointing a new special envoy.” In January 2012, the Dalai clique convened the 25th meeting of the “Tibet-China Peace Talks Preparatory Group” in Dharmasala in India, and passed a procedure for re-appointing a “special representative” for the Dalai. But the central government cannot possibly hold contact talks with a representative of the “Central Tibetan Administration” for the reason that the central government regards the “Central Tibetan Administration” as the continuation of the “Tibetan Government in Exile,” which it has defined as an illegal organization. At present, the Dalai has a sense of both despondency and urgency about the contact talks. The new boss of the “Government in Exile” dreams of forcing the central government to accept the “Government in Exile” as a counterpart in contact talks, and even tried to force the Dalai’s previous private representative to “resign.” The U.S. too dreams of forcing us into contact talks as soon as possible and making qualitative concessions. But our approach is perfectly clear: the Dalai clique disseminated its contact talks with the central government in the name of the “Government in Exile,” the Dalai issued a “reincarnation statement” to confront the central government, and then incited Tibetans within the borders to self-immolate and destroy their lives. If the problems above are not resolved, the atmosphere necessary for contact talks will be missing. The initiative for contact talks is firmly grasped within our own hands.

[...]

5.1.2 Strengthen ideological and political education, guide the masses to a correct understanding of history and reality

Prior to the democratic reforms, Tibetan society was enmeshed as a society of feudal theocratic serfdom, where the aristocratic class and the monk class used such means as land rent, high interest and indentured servitude to carry out brutal exploitation of the peasantry and used religion to bind them spiritually, all of which seriously contravened the interests of the people; following the democratic reforms, ordinary people were liberated from their peasant status in a feudal theocracy, and became the masters of their own home. Practice has proven that only with the socialist road have the Tibetan people been able to lead dignified lives, and only socialist theory was able to destroy the weapon of divine right. However, at the same time as improving people’s lives, we must also expose the ruling classes of the past in Tibet who wore the cloak of religion and we must strive for the moral high ground in the international community, because in the final analysis the Tibet issue is a battle for the hearts and minds of the people. Under new historical conditions, we must integrate the fundamental principles of Marxism with the history, culture, traditions and realities of national conditions, and greatly strengthen the ideological and political education of the masses.

Concretely speaking, we must bring our ideological and political strengths into play and expose the class nature and political nature of the Dalai clique. The Fifth Tibet Work Forum pointed out profoundly that

the Dalai clique represented “The remnants of the feudal serf-owning classes in old Tibet.” We should continue to deepen this elaboration of their essence with the progress of the times. For example, we could expose the “exiled Tibet independence clique” as it enters the “post-Dalai era” as the “remnant forces of the serf-owning class” mixed up with “political elites” reared by the West who have never truly considered Tibetan compatriots’ interests, and how the majority of exiled Tibetans who followed them out are now marginalized in poverty and sickness. We know that during the early period of reform and opening up Tibetans returning to the country to visit relatives were “rich,” but now, the domestic Tibetan masses who go abroad to see relatives are richer yet. And furthermore, following implementation of the strategy for leap-over-style development in Tibet and Tibetan areas, the standard of living for urban and rural Tibetan residents has risen unceasingly in comparison to the hopeless situation of ordinary Tibetans in poverty abroad, and the gap is growing ever greater and the contrast is becoming ever sharper. All of which explains who, indeed, represents the interests of the Tibetan people.

We must not only expose the nature of the Dalai clique, we must also struggle against the Dalai clique’s call to split the Motherland and let the people of the world see the Dalai clique’s true face. Lobsang Sangay, the Dalai’s Kalon Tripa, the head of the pseudo government, once said in an interview that “Tibetan autonomy” and “Tibet independence” were not contradictory, that from a dialectical point of view “autonomy” was the realistic aim and “independence” was the aim in principle. The “autonomy” demanded by the Dalai clique contravenes our country’s Constitution, the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law and the people’s interests, and is absolutely impossible. At the Fifth Tibet Work Forum, Comrade Xi Jinping pointed out that “Upholding regional ethnic autonomy is not for one nationality’s exclusive autonomy, and even less are ethnic autonomous places the exclusive property of a nationality. The key to being unwavering in upholding the system of regional ethnic autonomy is upholding the equality of all nationalities, upholding the mutual integration of a nationality’s factors and a region’s factors, with all nationalities enjoying and fulfilling equal rights and obligations.” This judgment has great innovative significance in both the theoretical and practical aspects of nationalities work, forcefully refuting the Dalai clique’s calls for a “greater Tibet” and a “high degree of autonomy” at the same time as guiding the masses to a correct understanding of Tibet’s history and reality.

[...]

5.5 Strengthening the effective management of Tibetan areas from the perspective of social control theory

In Western criminology, Control Theory is a theory on using society’s strengths and weaknesses to resolve the causes of criminal actions. This theory considers that the reason people do not commit crimes is because there exists all kinds of forces that inhibit and control crime. The American scholar Arthur Beeley in the book “Social Planning for Crime Control,” suggests that the factor of removing social controls and factor of self-control are reasons for and a theory for increases in crime. From the point of view of control, if social order is to be upheld and the occurrence of criminality lessened, then people’s actions and all forms of social problem can be controlled within limits that are permitted by and acceptable to society. With regard the current realities in Tibetan areas, a series of riots by the Dalai clique and incidents of self-immolation in recent years are related to a weakening of social controls in our country. Following the democratic reforms, Tibetan areas were in a process of transformation. The original social structures were smashed, hostile Western anti-China forces were infiltrating by means of the Dalai clique and new social structures had not yet been established, and for these reasons, the phenomena of imbalances, discord and loss of control were inevitable. Therefore, in order to strengthen the effective management of Tibetan areas, we must set out from the realities of the characteristics of nationalities and religion in Tibetan areas and establish a long-term mechanism for monastery management and perfect countermeasures for public security agencies to attack “Tibet independence” activities.

5.5.1 Establish a long-term mechanism for Tibetan Buddhist monastery management

In a series of self-immolation cases cracked by public security agencies, facts clearly proved that the self-immolation incidents are being controlled by the Fourteenth Dalai clique. The self-immolation incidents happened mostly at Kirti Monastery (in Ngaba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture), with the majority proven to show a direct connection with the Fourteenth Dalai's planning. Throughout the late 1980s and the incidents of rioting in Lhasa, and the "3.14" incident in 2008 as well as the incidents of Tibetans' "self-immolation," the reason that the Dalai clique has been able to incite such actions is because a small number of monasteries are used as propaganda bases, distorting the doctrines of Tibetan Buddhism and confusing unlawful monks and nuns. In all aspects there is a great disparity between our forces and those of the Dalai clique. The only thing they have to hype is religion, using the Fourteenth Dalai Lama's religious influence to engage in activities to split the Motherland. Because previously there was a lack of focus on the influence of Tibetan Buddhism in Tibetan areas there is no effective strengthened management of monasteries and monks and nuns in Tibetan areas, which has led them to be the concentrated epitome of the existence of problems and hidden dangers from riots and incidents of "self-immolation." Therefore, in order to resolve the issues of imperfect monastery management and confused thinking among some monks and nuns, a long-term mechanism for Tibetan Buddhist monastery management should be constructed.

After the Dalai clique manufactured a series of rioting incidents, the Tibetology Centre formed the "Construct a long-term mechanism for Tibetan Buddhist monastery management" [*visi*] special research group in order to understand conditions in monasteries and of the monks and nuns. Using questionnaires, they carried out a survey of monasteries and monks' and nuns' thinking in Tibet and the four provinces' Tibetan areas. They conducted field observations in 15 prefectures and prefecture-level cities and 35 counties (county-level cities), convened 97 forums of various sorts, conducted 87 individual interviews and visited 47 monasteries; 8000 questionnaires were issued to monks and nuns, and 4975 were returned which is an efficacy rate of 62%, and they created around 200 meeting minutes and interview records, compiling a rich body of first-hand research materials; they later conducted in-depth inspections of monasteries in different counties with a focus on Qinghai, Tibet and Sichuan, and summarised a great deal of practical experience of social and monastery management. When establishing a long-term mechanism for the management of Tibetan Buddhist monasteries these reliable research materials can be repeatedly referred to.

By means of studying the Tibetology Centre's survey of monasteries and monks and nuns in the form of its research report, the following problems with monasteries and monks and nuns can be understood to be presently extant: 1. Some monks and nuns regard the Dharma [Ch: *fofa*, lit., Buddha law] as greater than national law, they lack a sense of the Motherland, civic awareness and legal awareness, and they are unclear about the rights and wrongs of the Dalai clique's infiltration and incitement; 2. Democratic management committees are not sound, they are weak and lax, they are infiltrated by foreign forces, they have difficulties controlling the management of the monasteries' Buddhist activities, the management of their assets and the management of religious personnel; 3. There are too many and too varied people studying scriptures and there is a lack of effective management over people who exit the border for study and then return, and furthermore the Buddhist education system is imperfect, lacking scripture teachers who are politically reliable and who have religious attainments; 4. There is inconsistent leniency and strictness in tulku reincarnation policy implementation, and where the management of a tulku's reincarnation is neglected the struggles around the tulku's reincarnation are still very acute; 5. The management of monastics is weak in such aspects as follow-up management of dismissed personnel, the management of itinerant monastics, and monastics under the age of 18 entering monasteries still not being effectively controlled; 6. Monasteries' self-sustainment and monasteries' land-use lacks normative management, and there are such problems as economic "polarisation" in Tibetan Buddhist monasteries, arbitrary expansion of monasteries, relocation, auctioning, serious overcrowding of monks, complicated sources and channels of monastery funding and monks not abiding by precepts.

Therefore, in order to construct a long-term management mechanism for Tibetan Buddhist monastery management, the following work must be carried out well: One, by promoting social management, establish a long-term mechanism. First, we must push forward the promotion of orderliness in monastery

management, with all relevant government departments simultaneously extending social management and public services to cover monasteries. For example: public security agencies should concentrate on resolving the focused management of monastics' residency permits and the management of monastics' accommodation rental, and the extension of rule-of-law propaganda and education to monasteries, etc.; second, responsibility should be implemented in place [Ch: *yao zuodao zeren luoshi daomei*], the role played by the democratic management committees should be in place, mobilising their positivity and implementing reward and punishment systems and accountability systems. Two, resolve prominent problems and perfect the long-term mechanism. To construct a robust long-term monastery management mechanism prominent problems must be taken in hand and transformed from quantitative to qualitative. In our experience, smoothing out such prominent problems in monasteries as the management of tulku reincarnation, scriptural study and education, monastery self-sustainment and standardising land-use can be resolved in accordance with actual conditions in each place. Three, integrate social management into public services. Monastery and social management cannot focus only on the management of things and ignore services, and neither can it talk only of services and not discuss management. Neither service nor management can exist without the other, and indeed they should be complementary. Four, strengthen social management and promote self-management in religious circles. In the process of monasteries establishing robust self-management and the democratic management system, government should actively guide and promote monasteries to implement their inherent democratic management strengths, and place the monasteries' managerial authority firmly in the hands of religious personnel who Love the Country and Love the Religion.

5.5.2 Perfect public security agency strategies for attacking “Tibet independence” activities

In view of our long-term, complex and protracted struggle with the Dalai clique supported by hostile Western anti-China forces, and in the face of the new characteristics of the current “Tibet independence” splittist activities emerging, and in order to effectively contain the occurrence and spread of riots in Tibetan areas and “self-immolation” incidents, public security agencies should exterminate at the roots all activities which are harmful to stability in Tibetan areas, and in accordance with practical experiences from the current anti-splittist struggle, the following few suggestions are made:

First, intelligence construction must be strengthened, creating an elaborate intelligence and information network. Before the occurrence of the “self-immolation” incidents, the Dalai clique manipulated “Tibet independence” splittists to secretly connect with monks using QQ [instant messaging], and used inciting language and distorted Tibetan Buddhist doctrine to encourage monastics to self-immolate. But if insider intelligence and information was collected at the preparatory stage of the crime, then “Tibet independence” splittist acts would be nipped in the bud, protecting the masses' right to life and health. Intelligence is the first line of attack against “Tibet independence” harmful activities, and therefore, strengthening the gathering, processing and use of intelligence on “Tibet independence” activities is imperative for constructing a sophisticated intelligence network. Concrete steps would be as follows: first, strengthen efforts on constructing an intelligence network. Ever since the Dalai fled abroad, he has often used false remarks to incite dissatisfaction among Tibetans within the borders against the Party, he has used Tibetans studying scriptures to deceive them into splittist activities and used overseas Tibetans returning to the county visiting relatives to gather national intelligence. For this we must cultivate insider ears and eyes, properly carry out networking work, keeping abreast of criminal activity at the same time as focusing on managing the intelligence information network by establishing a complete guidance and reward system, mobilizing the enthusiasm of the personnel providing intelligence; and then we must strengthen online intelligence structures and construction. At present, the Internet has already become an important channel by which Tibetan compatriots within the border contact Tibetan compatriots abroad, and some “Tibet independence” elements use the Internet's covert features to convey falsehoods, directing the whole process for Tibetans within the border to self-immolate and affecting the social stability of Tibetan areas. Strengthening online intelligence work is important for adapting to the demands of the new situation.

Second, we must be in intimate contact with the masses and carry out full position control [Ch: *quan fangwei zhibendi kongzhi* – a military term applied to battlefields]. By means of position control, public security

agencies are able to discover and grasp clues on the activities of “Tibet independence” splittist elements, effectively carry out reconnaissance intelligence and prevention and protection work, register anyone suspected of criminality, conduct classification management, grasp the tracks of their actions and closely monitor their tendencies. Furthermore, when attacking and preventing “Tibet independence” activities, we must pay attention to the strength of the masses. The masses are the main body of society and are distributed in every corner of society. Splittist elements live among the broad masses, and it is hard for their illegal criminal activities to escape the eyes of the masses. In Tibet and the four provinces’ Tibetan areas, due to special ethnic and religious factors, relying on the masses to conduct position control has ever greater special significance.

Third, we must properly carry out detection and control work, attacking infiltration activities according to law. In his status as a religious leader, the Dalai Lama has interfered with domestic monasteries’ tulku reincarnations, incited monasteries’ monks and nuns to make trouble, planned “self-immolation” incidents, and obstructed and damaged patriotic education activities at Buddhist monasteries in Tibet and the four provinces’ Tibetan areas. The Dalai clique’s splittist act of infiltrating within the borders seriously affects social stability in Tibetan areas, and so when public security agencies discover elements of instability in a timely way within the borders during the course of their routine work, they must take strict control and strike as appropriate, and only thus can harm be effectively prevented and the initiative in the struggle can be grasped. To this end, public security agencies should combine both open and secretive measures to establish cases in a timely way against those who use Tibetan Buddhism to carry out infiltration and damage, and strengthen insider reconnaissance, gather evidence, solve cases in good time, and strike hard in accordance with the law. When a case has been broken, we must focus on the lead source of “Tibet independence” splittist ideology infiltration, and adopt public surveys, make full use of information and the Internet, establish high-level secrecy strengths, and strengthen management functions at venues for Tibetan Buddhist activities. With regard to leads with long-term value and in accordance with the principle of whoever is managing is the person responsible, broaden the scope of insider reconnaissance, and on the basis of gathering conclusive evidence, deliver timely strikes and processing, thereby eradicating the Dalai clique’s infiltration strongholds established in Tibetan areas.

Fourth, we must respond quickly and perfect a handling mechanism for “self-immolation” incidents in Tibetan areas. In recent years there have been frequent incidents of “self-immolation” in Tibetan areas, causing serious losses to the people’s lives and property. Public security agencies should strengthen their on-site handling abilities, and after investigating the relevant conditions of the case, deal with it resolutely, protecting people’s lives, assets and security to the greatest possible extent and minimizing any negative social impact. Furthermore, any “self-immolation” incidents planned by the Dalai clique occurring in Tibetan areas usually draw exceptional attention from the domestic and international community, and therefore, front-line public security agencies should perfect news and propaganda mechanisms for such incidents as these, and in a quick and timely manner carry out news and propaganda work to actively guide the direction of public opinion.