Chinas Failed Tibet Policies

17 Points of Disagreement; 70 Years of China’s Failed Policies in Tibet

23 May marks the 1951 anniversary of the signing of the controversial Seventeen Point Agreement between Tibet and China – just after China occupied Tibet. The Agreement is an important historical document that highlights a crucial turning point in Tibet’s history. 

The Agreement, which was signed by Tibetan leaders under duress, changed Tibet’s status from independent to accepting Chinese sovereignty while leaving the Tibetan government as decision-makers over religion, language and political institutions. The agreement was to provide guarantees to respect mutual needs and establish a relationship between the Chinese and Tibetan governments.

Less than a decade into the agreement, in March 1959, tens of thousands of Tibetans were killed after staging a mass uprising against China’s rule in an attempt to protect the Dalai Lama and defend freedom and human rights.

Both the Tibetan and Chinese governments rejected the Agreement, which led to the escape of the Dalai Lama to safety in exile.

In the six decades since the agreement was signed, the Chinese central government has unilaterally instituted increasingly hardline policies that undermine Tibetan culture and religion; the Tibetan people have been denied freedom of expression; the use of their language has been downgraded, and their economic resources appropriated by the Chinese state, with increasing numbers of Chinese migrants moving to Tibet.

1. Military Occupation not Peaceful Liberation

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China Says: “The peaceful liberation of Tibet was a major event in modern Chinese history and an epoch-making turning point in the course of development in Tibet.” President Hu Jintao.

Reality: China’s ‘peaceful liberation’ of Tibet was a military invasion that began in 1949; on 7 October 1950 40,000 troops from the People’s Liberation Army crossed the Drichu (Yangtse) river into central Tibet. Hopelessly outnumbered, the Tibetan army surrendered; Tibet, an independent country since 1911 became an occupied state. Chinese persecution steadily increased, as did Tibetan resistance; in March 1959 popular protests erupted in Lhasa. When the PLA began shelling the city the Dalai Lama was forced to escape Tibet. China stated 87,000 Tibetans were killed or arrested as a result of the Uprising. In 1989 Martial Law was imposed and China still maintains a strong military presence, with estimates of between 150,000 – 500,000 PLA troops stationed on the Tibetan Plateau, with a significant increase in the visible military presence during periods of unrest. Despite a major crackdown following the plateau-wide Uprisings of 2008, Tibetans continue to resist China’s occupation. Since 2009, a series of self-immolations by Tibetan monks, nuns and laypeople and numerous large-scale protests show that China has failed to win Tibetan hearts and minds.

2. Tibetans: A Nation not a Minority

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China Says: “As a member of the big family of the Chinese nation, the Tibetan people have created and developed their brilliant and distinctive culture during a long history of continuous exchanges and contacts with other ethnic groups” Liu Yandong, United Front.

Reality: The PRC claims Tibetans are among 55 ethnic nationalities bound together by a common destiny. This fabrication, rooted in China’s deep historical ethnocentrism, became the foundation for China’s colonization of Tibet and in other neighboring territories. Tibet is not only a clearly defined nation, but the government of Tibet fulfilled the criteria of a sovereign state three decades before the founding of the PRC. Prior to the invasion, Tibetans and Chinese had little to no contact and China did not formally exercise control over Tibet. China’s leaders however classified Tibetans as ‘barbaric uncivilized’ peoples that should be ‘assimilated or eliminated’. Tibetans, fiercely proud and independent, showed no signs of assimilating and thus the CCP pursued policies to eliminate the Tibetan nation.

3. Rule by Force not Consent

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China Says: “We must build up a Great Wall in our fight against separatism and safeguard the unity of the motherland, and push Tibet’s basic stability towards long-term stability” Hu Jintao.

Reality: After over 70 years China still relies on military and paramilitary control of Tibet, control which is stepped up around sensitive anniversaries. Mass protests have continued across Tibetan areas since 2008, for example in eastern Tibet during 2014 in protest at the detention of abbot Khenpo Kartse. There are currently at least 824 political prisoners in Tibet. Between 2013 to 2017, China’s domestic security spending grew 34% faster than total spending and in 2017 it was almost 20% higher than its national defence budget, illustrating the extent of Beijing’s efforts to control and surveill everyday life, particularly in Tibet. China has never accounted for the thousands it detained in 2008, or the numerous deaths resulting from its security measures, for example in August 2014 at least 10 Tibetans were injured when Chinese security forces opened fire on an unarmed gathering. Three of those were confirmed to have died of their wounds after being denied medical treatment.

4. Poverty not Prosperity

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China Says: In 2020, Tibet’s gross domestic product (GDP) surpassed 190 billion yuan (around 29.2 billion U.S. dollars) while per capita disposable income for Tibet’s rural residents grew 12.7 percent, while that for urban residents rose 10 percent. The regional government has set Tibet’s GDP growth target in 2021 at more than 9 percent.

 Reality: Despite vast investment in the TAR – with fixed-asset investment in the region expected to surpass 130 billion yuan in 2015 – these funds mainly benefit Chinese migrants and have actually contributed to the economic marginalisation of Tibetans. Andrew Fischer, an economist specialising in development who analysed Chinese government statistics calls Tibet’s growth ‘ethnically exclusionary’. The speed and scale of Han Chinese migration onto the Tibetan plateau, and the unequal business and employment opportunities this migration creates, were some of the driving forces behind protests in Lhasa in 2008.

5. Dalai Lama: Peace Icon not Wolf

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China Says: “We are in the midst of a fierce struggle involving blood and fire, a life and death struggle with the Dalai clique,” TAR Party Secretary, Zhang Qingli. TAR Chairman Jampa Phuntsog was quoted by China Daily as saying the majority of Tibetan people do not want the Dalai Lama to return.

Reality: The Dalai Lama is the pre-eminent representative of the Tibetan people and a globally respected icon of peace. He is viewed by Beijing as enemy number one, described as a “wolf in monk’s robes” and “a monster with human face and animal’s heart”. His image is banned in Tibet. Tibetan monks, nuns and laypeople who have self-immolated in Tibet have consistently called for the return of the Dalai Lama as well as freedom for Tibet. China called the Dalai Lama’s prayers for those who died through self-immolation “terrorism in disguise” (5d). In December 2019, a Tibetan father and son were arrested for listening to teachings from the Dalai Lama while in July 2020, two Tibetans were imprisoned after composing and singing songs praising the Dalai Lama.

6. Language: Assimilation not Protection

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China Says: “All nationalities have the freedom to use and develop their own spoken and written languages,” Article 4, Constitution of the PRC.

Reality: While the official policy is termed “bilingual education,” far from promoting the teaching academic content in two languages, this measure has resulted in the replacement of Tibetan with Chinese as the medium of instruction in primary schools throughout the region, with the exception of classes studying Tibetan as a language. New measures have been initiated since 2018, to ensure the continued marginalisation of the Tibetan language. Even Tibetan children as young as three years old are taught in Chinese language, at the expense of Tibetan.

Tibetans who air their grievances about the erosion of Tibetan language education have continued to face reprisals by the Chinese authorities since the Committee’s last review.  Sonam Palden, a 22 year old Tibetan monk and language rights advocate from Kirti Monastery in Ngaba was arrested on 19 September 2019, after posting comments on social media platform WeChat expressing concern about Beijing’s policies in Tibet that are leading to the eradication of the Tibetan language in a poem entitled ‘Father Tongue’. Sonam remains in incommunicado detention, unable to see his family or lawyer, placing him at a significantly elevated risk of torture. 

Meanwhile “..there are few lucrative job prospects for Tibetans who have not been educated in Chinese. Nor [can] a student educated in Tibetan acquire professional qualifications at college or university. There are no relevant courses taught in Tibetan” Tsering Dorje, teacher. Street signs are in Chinese, official documents generally only available in Chinese and letters addressed in Tibetan are not delivered. In spite of China’s efforts, a resurgence of the Tibetan language as an expression of identity is underway in Tibet.

7. Occupation is No Holiday

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China Says: In 2019, Tibet received 40 million tourists and its annual tourism revenue hit 56 billion yuan (7.9 billion U.S. dollars).

Reality: With millions of domestic and overseas visitors each year Beijing expects tourism, a designated ‘pillar industry’, to accelerate economic development in Tibet. Whilst attempting to maximize tourism’s profitability, the authorities control what tourists see and understand. Tour guides and hoteliers are under pressure to provide an officially sanctioned version of Tibetan history. Guides risk suspension and imprisonment for perceived indiscretions including befriending tourists or disregarding the party line. The Tibet Autonomous Region is regularly closed to tourists during sensitive anniversaries or visits by Chinese leaders, officials occasionally citing ‘limited accommodation capacity’ , despite several international hotels, including the St Regis and InterContinental’s Resort Lhasa Paradise now operate in Lhasa.

8. Oppression not Emancipation

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China Says: “without the peaceful liberation of Tibet, the entry of the Chinese Communist Party and the PLA, those oppressed and enslaved Tibetan people would not have deeply understood the policy of the CPC”, Zhu Weiqun, United Front.

Reality: The Chinese Communist Party claims it liberated Tibet from the “oppressive, feudal rule of the Dalai Lama”, a medieval, oppressive society consisting of ‘landowners, serfs and slaves’. In March 2009 the Dalai Lama said that Beijing’s policies “thrust Tibetans into such depths of suffering and hardship that they literally experienced hell on Earth”. Ultimately, Beijing’s condemnation of Tibet’s ‘feudal’ past is a classic colonialist argument – ‘backwardness’ serving as a justification for invasion. Pre-invasion, many Tibetans recognized inequalities in their system and the Dalai Lama had begun to promote improvements. The founding of ‘serf-emancipation day’ in 2009 is symbolic of China’s continued colonial vision of Tibet, while the exiled Tibetan government is now a democracy.

9. Religious Repression Not Freedom

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China Says:  “It is necessary to actively guide Tibetan Buddhism to adapt to the socialist society and promote the sinicization of Tibetan Buddhism” President Xi Jinping, 2020.

Reality: Since China’s occupation, Tibetan Buddhism has been under attack to undermine the core belief system at its heart and sever loyalty to the Dalai Lama. An estimated 6,000 monasteries were destroyed and today the number of monks and nuns are vastly reduced, religious institutions tightly controlled and ‘patriotic re-education’ campaigns regularly carried out where Tibetans are required to denounce the Dalai Lama, declare their loyalty to the CCP and that Tibet is an inalienable part of China. Reports of the torture and sexual abuse of monks and nuns have surfaced in recent years for those detained in facilities for ‘correction’.

Larung Gar Buddhist Institute, the largest and one of the most significant sites in Tibetan Buddhism, has been targeted by the Chinese authorities. It was established in 1980 and grew to become home to anywhere between 10,000 and 40,000 residents but between June 2016 and May 2017 at least 4,800 residents were forcibly evicted and transported from Larung Gar to other parts of Tibet, and 4,725 buildings – mostly houses – were demolished. Residents have similarly been subjected to forced evictions from the Buddhist Institute, Yarchen Gar, in Kardze, Kham, Tibet (Ch: Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan Province). In 2016, at least 1,000 residents were forcibly evicted, in 2018, 3,500 residential homes were torn down and in August 2019 when a further wave of demolitions were carried out.  

In 1995 six-year old Gedhun Choekyi Nyima, the Dalai Lama’s choice of 11th Panchen Lama, disappeared and remains missing, and in 1999 the 17th Karmapa felt compelled to flee Tibet. China now insists that permission to reincarnate must be given by the government.

10. Crisis at the Third Pole

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China Says: Strengthening environmental protection on the Tibetan plateau is important for “maintaining border stability, ethnic unity and the building of a well-off society,” State Council statement.

Reality: Tibet, known as the Third Pole because it holds the third largest store of glacial freshwater, is warming twice as fast as the rest of the world. Glacial melt from the plateau is disrupting water supplies, threatening sustainable livelihoods and putting more than one billion downstream peoples at risk. Since occupying Tibet, China’s policies have brought region-wide famine, desertification on the grasslands, acute flooding from clear-cutting Tibet’s forests, and environmental destruction through unregulated mining. China’s solution is to build more dams, which will deny downstream users a stable supply of water. In turn, China blames Tibet’s nomads, not its own policies, for threatening China’s precious water resources.

Tibetan human rights defenders who advocate for environmental protection are frequently subjected to arrest and trumped up prison sentences. A-Nya Sengdra, a Tibetan nomad and environmental defender, was sentenced to seven years in prison, for “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” and “gathering people to disturb public order” on 4 September 2018. A-Nya was arrested after he campaigned against illegal mining and the illegal hunting and gathering of endangered animals in Tibet as well as corrupt practices by Chinese officials. China has defied calls by 5 UN Experts to lift charges against him

Tibetans reporting environmental concerns are similarly targeted. On 8 November 2013, Kunchok Jinpa, a Tibetan tour guide, was arrested in Driru County, Nagchu Prefecture, Central Tibet [CH: Biru, Naqu, Tibet Autonomous Region]. He was convicted of “leaking state secrets” and sentenced to 21 years in jail after he shared information to foreign media, including via social media, about environmental and other protests. On 6 February 2021, Kunchok Jinpa, died after he was transferred from prison to hospital in what is now the most recent case of Tibetan deaths in custody following reports of torture.  Kunchok had suffered a brain hemorrhage and was paralyzed.

11. Colonization with Chinese Characteristics

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China Says: “In carrying out the strategy of large-scale western development, development will be greatly accelerated and human talent will flow westward.” Li Dezhu, State Ethnic Affairs Commission.

Reality: A 1980s ‘open door’ policy encouraged Chinese workers into the TAR. The 2010 census gives the population of the TAR as around 3 million Tibetans, with Han Chinese making up 8.17 per cent – a figure that however does not include many Han migrants, military forces and their families resident for extended periods in Tibet.  In 2002 officials admitted encouraging Chinese migration, telling journalists Tibetans would soon be in a minority in Lhasa and that the influx of Chinese migrants was part of a drive to develop the economy, bring prosperity and stability (11c). The reality of colonial life for many Tibetans consists of discrimination and exclusion. For instance, in 2020 a UN Committee has expressed concern that the high levels of unemployment of Tibetans is in part due to Han Chinese migration to Tibetan areas

In an expanded programme of new kindergarten’s across Tibet, Tibetan toddlers are increasingly encouraged to adopt a Chinese identity while expressions of their Tibetan identity are discouraged. In the Mingxin Bilingual Kindergarten in Tsoe City (Chinese: Hezuo), Gansu, Tibetan children were pictured celebrating the New Year dressed in Chinese clothes in a classroom decorated with Chinese-character banners one of which read:  “What we eat is Chinese style, what we wear is Chinese style, what is written is in Chinese characters.”

Increasing numbers of Tibetans are also being sent away to residential schools where they are required to pledge to uphold  “ethnic unity” and be patriotic citizens. These policies are reminiscent of ones used by colonial powers who forcibly removed indigenous children in Australia, Canada and the US in order to assimilate them into ‘settler’ society.

12. Forcing Nomads off Land

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China Says: ‘All herdsmen are expected to end the nomadic life by the end of the century’; report quoting Qi Jingfa, Agriculture Vice-Minister 1998.

Reality: At least 2.25 million Tibetans live nomadic or semi-nomadic lives, a way of life that is an intrinsic part of Tibetan society. Following the occupation, nomads were classified as ‘uncivilized‘ and their lifestyle threatened by China’s agricultural and collectivisation policies. Although China missed its 2000 deadline to end nomadic life, efforts to force Tibetans into ghetto-style housing blocks have intensified since the launch of China’s ‘Western Development Plan’. In January 2011, officials said 1.43 million farmers and herders had new homes and in 2012, China’s State Council approved a plan to start settlement projects for 1.16 million rural herdsmen by 2015. As part of this drive, between 2015-2020, official Chinese media claimed that over 2.8 million farmers and herdsmen in Tibet were ‘transferred’ from the agricultural sector to secondary and tertiary industry in urban areas, with 604,000 transferred in 2020 alone. The programme is being used to dismantle rural economies, further political indoctrination, undermine cultural identities, and expand surveillance measures.

Land, seized under false claims of ‘environmental protection’ in the age of climate change, is cleared largely to make way for dams and mining operations. For thousands of years, Tibetan nomads lived sustainably on the grasslands; now China’s policy of ‘converting rangelands to pastures’ is leading to overgrazing in fenced-in areas and exacerbating desertification. Coercive settlement is causing economic and social problems, likely to fuel greater unrest.

13. Railroading Tibet

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China Says: “Since late 2012, China has been strengthening its infrastructure investment in Tibet. So far, roads have connected 95 percent of the township-level administrations and 75 percent of the incorporated villages in the region.” In 2020 Reuters reported that China is planning a more than $146 billion push to accelerate infrastructure investment in Tibet, including new and previously announced projects.

Reality: In August 2020, at the 7th Tibet Work Forum held in Beijing, Chinese President Xi Jinping said that China must build an “impregnable fortress” to maintain stability in Tibet, protect national unity and educate the masses in the struggle against “splittism.”

China’s financial investment in Tibet is substantial, but the emphasis on large infrastructure rather than community-led projects has delivered patchy development that seldom benefits the poorest Tibetans. One of the most significant projects to date is the Gormo-Lhasa Railway, completed July 2006, which has accelerated the influx of Chinese into Tibet, further excluding Tibetans from the local economy, exacerbating resentment and thereby making China’s aimed-for ‘stability’ more unlikely. 

In August 2017 it was reported that Chinese armed police threatened Tibetan nomads and removed them and their cattle from their traditional grazing pastures in an area that appears to correlate with a new railway as part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

As part of the BRI more rail lines are being built across Tibet including one from Amdo Tsonub Gormo to Korla in East Turkistan . The routes are promoted as “poverty alleviation” and “good for the locals’ but on closer examination the new rail routes tell us much about China’s motives and plans to increase the exploitation of Tibet’s natural resources and solidify the swift deployment of the military to more areas.

14. Control of the Water Tower

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China says: ‘”Although Tibet is rich with water and hydropower resources, water resources are still one of the key factors in restricting Tibet’s development” Zhang [Qingli] stressed it is of great urgency to develop water infrastructure projects in Tibet’

Reality: One only has to look at a map of Asia and run a finger along the major rivers to realise that what happens in Tibet impacts more than one billion people across Asia. 

Many new large hydroelectric dams, mammoth water diversion projects, unregulated mining in the headwater regions, and the compounding effects of global climate change are matters of growing concern.  Given Tibet holds the largest store of fresh water outside the Arctics, Tibet’s environment impacts not just for the region, but for all of humanity. Ensuring food and water security, requires a sustainable, long-term and trans-boundary approach to water governance.

Until 2014, Tibet hosted the largest undammed river in the world; the Yarlung Tsangpo. The first of a series of dams on the river – called the ‘Zangmu Project’ and proposed as the world’s biggest hydro-power scheme – is hugely controversial given the catastrophic threats on the ecological biodiversity of the region, the compounding effects on global climate change, and will effectively cut off the water supply downstream to 1.4 billion people

As in other development projects, Tibetan voices have been absent from decision-making about dam construction.

15. Long life: Not for Dissidents

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China Says:The average life expectancy in Southwest China’s Tibet Autonomous Region has increased from 35.5 years before 1959 to 70.6 years in 2018’.

Reality: Coercively settled nomads report that promised healthcare provision is seldom available, whilst Tibetans generally find healthcare unaffordable. The rise in prostitution in Lhasa raises concerns about AIDs. Dissent significantly affects life expectancy; those injured in demonstrations are too afraid to seek medical treatment and deaths linked to detention are common. In July 2015, Tibet’s most prominent political prisoner, buddhist leader Tenzin Delek Rinpoche died in prison, 13 years into a life sentence. Between April 2019 and early 2021, at least five Tibetans have died in custody, including Tenzin Nyima, a 19-year-old monk who died in January 2021 after he was beaten to death in Chinese custody. Tenzin had been arrested alongside four young Tibetan monks from Dza Wonpo Village after they staged a peaceful demonstration outside the local police station during which they threw leaflets in the air and called for Tibet’s independence.

16. A Second Cultural Revolution

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China Says: “The government has dedicated a large amount of manpower, materials and funds to the protection and promotion of fine traditional Tibetan culture… bringing about unprecedented protection and development of Tibetan culture.” White Paper 2008. “Anyone possessing illegal music or videos will be severely dealt with.” Shigatse School website.

Reality: Beijing has always relied on music and song to deliver propaganda, but the authorities maintain a roster of ‘acceptable’ Tibetan singers; dozens of Tibetan language songs are banned and security checkpoints regularly check Tibetans’ phones for illegal songs and ringtones. Some 30 Tibetan writers and performers have been detained and served sentences, including singer Tashi Dhondup but despite this, increasing numbers of artists are reasserting their cultural identity, calling for unity among Tibetans, and celebrating the enduring spirit of the Tibetan people.

17. Happiness at Gunpoint

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China Says: CCTV announced that Lhasa was awarded China’s ‘Happiest City’ in 2016.

Reality: Responding to the former designation of Lhasa as the City ‘with the Happiest people’ in 2010, Tibetan writer and intellectual Woeser responded “living under gunpoint day and night, being followed by snipers even when going to the temple to pray, how can there be any sense of happiness? Is it possible that after such a short time, Lhasa people left behind the gory terror of 2008 and their faces were wreathed in smiles again? Since they are happier than so many other people from many other Chinese cities, why do they still take to the streets?”.

You can read Woeser’s blog post “Happiness under Gunpoint” in full, here


(a) Tsering Shakya, ‘Dragon in the Land of Snows’, 1999.
(b) Stand Up for Tibet
(c) International Tibet Network statement, 13 July 2015.

1a. Hu Jintao, Lhasa 19 July 2001.
1b. Tsering Shakya, ‘Dragon in the Land of Snows’, 1999.
1c. “The Tibetans have every moral right to their independence for which they have fought successfully in the past, and we are committed to support them in maintaining it.” (UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office to Chongqing, June 1942).
1d. On 30 March 2011, Court No. 2 of Spain’s National High Court, the Audiencia Nacional, acknowledged Tibet is an occupied state under international law.
1e. Radio Lhasa broadcast, 1 October 1960.
1f. Tibet Justice Center.
1g. Stand Up For Tibet.

2a. Liu Yandong, first China Tibetan Culture Forum October 2006.
2b. China White Paper 28 September 2009.
2c. Delaney, Cusack and van Walt van Praag, ‘The Case Concerning Tibet’, 1998.
2d. Ibid.
2e. International Campaign for Tibet, ‘Jampa, the Story of Racism in Tibet’, 2001, page 24.

3a. Hu Jintao, 9 March 2009.
3b. US State Department Report on Human Rights 2010.
3c. China’s 2013 public security budget was RMB 769 billion, compared to the 2008 figure of RMB 406 billion. Public security spending has exceeded national defence since 2010. For 2013 figures see Reuters 5 March 2013 and for 2008 figures see here. 2014’s budget was withheld.
3d. Human Rights Watch ‘I Saw it With My Own Eyes’, 2010.
3e. Free Tibet, August 2014.

4a. Xinhua, 18 January 2015.
4b. Ibid
4c. A M Fischer, ‘Perversities of Extreme Dependence and Unequal Growth in the TAR’, 2007. Available from Here.

5a. Zhang Qingli, 19 March 2008 & Qiangba Puncog (Jampa Phuntsog), 20 June 2007.
5b. Zhang Qingli, 19 March 2008.
5c. The Independent, 20 May 1996.
5d. The Guardian, 19 October 2011.
5e. International Campaign for Tibet, January 2015.

6a. See Source.
6b. Free Tibet, ‘Forked Tongue: Tibetan language under attack’, 21 February 2008.
6c. Woeser’s Blog, ‘When Tibetan Students fight for the Tibetan language’, 4 November 2010, translated by Hugh Peaks Pure Earth.
6d. BBC report, 20 October 2010.
6e. Tsering Shakya, ‘The Politics of Language’, December 2007.

7a. 10th TAR People’s Congress, 20 March 2015.
7b. Zhang Qingli, 7 March 2011.
7c. The Independent, 3 November 2010.

8a. Interview for “China’s Tibet”, 7 May 2011.
8b. Blog post by James Reynolds, BBC, 19 January 2009.
8c. The Times, 10 March 2009.
8d. Lhadon Tethong, ‘China’s favorite propaganda on Tibet… and Why it’s Wrong’.
8e. Tsering Shakya, ‘Tibet and China: the past in the present’, 2009.

9a. Qin Yizhi, Lhasa Party Secretary, 28 March 2011.
9b. Tibetan Government in Exile.
9c. International Campaign for Tibet, 22 April 2011.
9d. Padma Choling, quoted by Reuters, 7 March 2011.
9e. The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom’s 2014 Annual Report.

10a. State Council Meeting chaired by Wen Jiabao, 30 March 2011.
10b. International Campaign for Tibet ‘Tracking the Steel Dragon’, 2008, pg 231.
10c. Tibetan government in exile Environment Report 2008. Available from Here.

11a. Li Dezhu State Ethnic Affairs Commission, in Qiu Shi, 1 June 2000.
11b. See Here.
11c. New York Times, 8 August 2002.

12a. Qin Jingfa, Vice Minister or Agriculture, quoted in Xinhua 18 March 1998.
12b. International Campaign for Tibet, ‘Tracking the Steel Dragon’, 2008.
12c. Gabriel Lafitte, ‘Eight Chinese Myths about Tibetan Nomads’, 2011.
12d. Padma Choling, 16 January 2011.
12e. Xinhua, 30 May 2012.
12f. Oliver W Frauenfeld and Tingjun Zhang, ‘Is Climate Change on the Tibetan Plateau Driven by Land Use/Cover Change?’ 2005.
12g. Feng Yongfeng, ‘The Tibetan Plateau: the plight of ecological migrants’, 2008.

13a. Xinhua, 18 January 2015.
13b. Padma Choling, 28 March 2011 & Zhang Qingli, 6 March 2011.
13c. International Campaign for Tibet, ‘Tracking the Steel Dragon’, 2008.

14a. Zhang Qingli, 28 March 2011.
14b. China File, 14 May 2015.
14c. The Guardian, 24 May 2010.
14d. China File, 14 May 2015.
14e. Conservation International.

15a. Padma Choling, 16 January 2011 and 28 March 2011.
15b. TCHRD report documents crisis of maternal and child health in Tibet, March 2015.
15c. Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, 31 March 2014. Goshul Lobsang tortured with pain-inducing injections, leaves a defiant note after untimely death.
15d. International Tibet Network statement, 13 July 2015.

16a. China White Paper, 25 September 2008 & Notice on Shigatse High School Website, April 2010.
16b. Bhuchung D Sonam, ‘Banned Lyrics, Reactionary Songs’, 2010.
16c. International Campaign for Tibet, ‘A Raging Storm’, 2010.

17a. Woeser’s blog ‘Happiness under Gunpoint‘ translated by High Peaks Pure Earth, 14 February 2011.
17b. Ibid.